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1. Introduction and Motivation
The vitality and stability of our democracy - as well as the economy -
eventually depend on the social permeability of our society1.
This statement draws attention to the strong meritocratic believes concerning the
equality of opportunity that govern public debates. This is especially true for the
education system. According to public rhetoric it is aimed to guarantee social mobil-
ity in Germany. Families receive a child benet transfer, schooling for up to 13 years
is free of charge and, if education is continued at a university, the cost of living is
covered by federal aid for students from low-income families. But, does this general
concern translate into a society in which one's economic success is independent of
the family born into? And if so, to what degree?
1Horst K ohler, German Federal President, in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 29.12.2007, Berlin (own translation).
1To empirically analyze the intergenerational relationship, the following economet-
ric model
yi
1 =  + yyi
0 + i
1 (1)
is used as a starting point (Corak 2004). A linear relationship between long-run
economic status yi
0 and yi
1 of family i in generation 0 and 1 is assumed, allowing
for shifts in mean economic status independent of parental status via the parameter
. Deviations from predicted status due to market luck or other random elements
in the intergenerational transmission of skills and personal traits are summarized
in the idiosyncratic error term i
1. Ideally, permanent earnings are chosen as the
measure of economic status (Friedman 1957). We use both terms to describe the
long-run economic success of an individual. In the case all status variables are
measured in their natural logarithm, y in equation (1) is the intergenerational
elasticity of permanent earnings. It measures the (expected) percentage change in
ospring's economic status associated with a one percent change in parental success.
In principle, y can take any value but most studies nd a value between zero and
one2. A positive value does indicate generational persistence of permanent earnings
in which higher parental long-run status favors economic success of one's ospring;
a negative number indicates generational reversal of economic status. A value of
zero for the intergenerational elasticity y (child's and parental economic success are
unrelated) corresponds to complete intergenerational mobility, while a value of unity
(the child's economic success is completely determined by parental achievement) is
associated with complete immobility. (1   y) provides a measure of the degree to
which economic status regresses to the mean (Becker & Tomes 1986, Goldberger
1989). If it takes value one (y = 0), a child from parents who attain below average
long-run status can expect average status just as the ospring of high status parents.
Although there is agreement about the existence of an intergenerational link in
economic status, a number of recent studies debate its varying magnitude across
countries (Solon 2002, Grawe 2006, J antti, Red, Naylor, Bj orklund, Bratsberg,
Raaum,  Osterbacka & Erikson 2006, Vogel 2007). While many features of the hu-
man skill formation process are universal, there may however be unique features in
German data. In an international perspective, low tuition fees and federal student
2See Solon (2002) for a recent survey.
2aid might ease the impact of borrowing constraints and thus enhance mobility in
Germany compared to other countries.
The contribution of our paper to the literature on intergenerational persistence
is twofold. First, based upon recent improvements in the understanding of the
association between short- and long-run economic status we asses the potential biases
in previous studies. Deviations of current from permanent economic status arise due
to transitory uctuations (Bowles 1972, Solon 1992) and a time-varying association
between the two (Haider & Solon 2006, Grawe 2006). We introduce a novel sampling
procedure that accounts for both and allows to observe father-son pairs at a rather
similar stage of their lifecycle. Second, the relationship is assessed for Germany with
samples drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1984-2006.
Our results suggest that the best conservative point estimate of intergenerational
earnings persistence among West German workers is 1
3. This indicates a lower degree
of mobility (and a higher degree of persistence) in Germany compared to Couch &
Dunn (1997) and Wiegand (1997) but is in line with Vogel (2007), who compares
intergenerational mobility between Germany and the United States. In an inter-
national perspective, the intergenerational earnings persistence seems to be lower
compared to the United States US
y = 0:4 (Solon 1992), and higher compared to
Sweden S
y = 0:2 (Bj orklund & J antti 1997). There still seems to be substantial
intergenerational earnings mobility among West German workers, but more persis-
tence than previous research suggested.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an introduc-
tion to the econometric methods applied to estimate intergenerational persistence
with incomplete data. Section 3 presents our novel sampling procedure with the
SOEP. Section 4 discusses the econometric ndings, whereas section 5 concludes.
2. Econometric Problems and Findings from the Literature
In this section the econometric problems associated with measuring intergenerational
persistence and the consequences we draw regarding its estimation among German
workers are pointed out.
2.1. Measurement Error Problems
The deduction of an individual's permanent earnings requires a lifelong earnings
history. Since researchers usually lack direct measures of long-run status yi
0 and yi
1
3for two generations in order to investigate intergenerational mobility, they rely on
proxies (yi
0h;yi
1t) of permanent earnings for each generation (0;1) observed at age h
and t. Sometimes only single-year measures of earnings3 have been used. Usually,
however, a short-run measure of economic status is an imperfect proxy of long-run
status. It is subject to measurement error due to transitory uctuations and lifecycle
variation in the association between current and lifetime earnings4.
2.1.1. Transitory Fluctuations
Current earnings of fathers yi
0h and sons yi












1 describe time-invariant permanent earnings, while (i
0h;i
1t) indicates time-
varying transitory uctuations. The latter might arise from job mobility, business
cycle eects or variable compensation schemes. If current earnings deviate from
permanent status, using them as a proxy for long-run status introduces attenuation
bias in the estimation of equation (1). Assuming that i
1t and i
0h are uncorrelated
with each other and permanent earnings yi
0 and yi
1, a deviation implies a downward
inconsistency of the estimated slope coecient ^ OLS
y in an OLS estimation by the
factor h (Solon 1992).
plim ^ OLS




V ar[y0] + V ar[0h]

(5)
The attenuation factor h captures how much signal V ar[y0] is provided by the
measure y0h relative to its total noise, V ar[y0h] = V ar[y0] + V ar[0h].
Based on single-year snapshots, empirical ndings by Corcoran, Laren, Gordon &
Solon (1991), Card (1994) and Hyslop (2001) suggest an attenuation factor around
h = 0:5. This implies a (considerable) signal-to-noise ratio of observed parental
earnings and an attenuation bias of (1   h) = 0:5. Note also, that transitory
3See Behrman & Taubman (1985) as an example.
4For a further errors-in-reporting problem see Bound & Krueger (1991) and Duncan & Hill (1985).
4uctuations in ospring's earnings i
1t do not bias the OLS estimation in equation
(1) as long as they are uncorrelated with i
0h. However, the higher their variance,
the larger the condence interval of ^ OLS
y will be.
Averaging Parental Earnings
To decrease the magnitude of the inconsistency, Solon (1992) suggests to average
parental status over T years which reduces the variance of the noise relative to the









As more years of data are used, the attenuation factor h rises and the attenuation
bias (1   h) declines. According to Mazumder (2005), the attenuation factor h
rises to h = 0:7 (from h = 0:5) when relying on a 5-year average of earnings.
The attenuation bias is reduced to [(1   h) = 0:3]. Solon (1992) and Wiegand
(1997) estimated an intergenerational elasticity of father's and son's earnings based
on 5-year averages of 0.4 for the United States and 0.2 for Germany. Given the
attenuation factor mentioned above the true elasticities would come closer to 0.6 for
the United States and 0.3 for Germany.
Instrumenting Parental Earnings
In a second approach to estimate y, the direct projection of yi
1 on yi
0, Solon (1992)
proposes an IV estimation. Acknowledging the diculties of nding an instrument,
that is correlated with parental long-run status but not a structural determinant
of ospring's permanent earnings, the basic model in equation (1) is amended to







In this case, performing an IV estimation of y using Ii
0 as the instrument, yields
5the following probability limit, Solon (1992).
plim ^ IV














y is an unbiased estimator for y only if the instrument does not inuence o-
spring's status (I = 0) or the instrument and parental status are perfectly corre-
lated, jj = 1. The closer jj is to one, the smaller the bias as there is less variation
in earnings that is not captured by the instrument. Assuming a positive but imper-
fect correlation between the instrument and parental long-run status, the direction
of the inconsistency is determined by I. If the instrument Ii
0 has a positive impact
on ospring' s status (I > 0), the estimator will be biased upward. If the opposite
is true, the estimated coecient is downward biased like the OLS estimate.
In empirical research, parental years of education (Solon 1992, Dearden, Machin &
Reed 1997) or indicators of occupational prestige (Zimmerman 1992, Wiegand 1997)
have been used to instrument long-run parental status. Since years of education
enhance labor market earnings, it may capture an important part of parental per-
manent earnings, although not necessarily to a 100%5. In this case an IV estimate
using years of education will be upward biased.
Estimating the intergenerational elasticity ^ y using OLS and IV techniques there-
fore suggests to bracket the coecient (Solon 1992). The OLS estimate is downward
inconsistent due to error-in-variable bias, whereas the IV estimate is presumably up-
ward biased. Accounting for the associated standard errors, y is located between
the two estimates.
^ OLS
y < y < ^ IV
y
2.1.2. Lifecycle Variations
Empirical research as well as theoretical reasoning suggest that wage workers dier
with respect to their age-earnings proles6. This may occur due to age-specic het-
erogeneity in human capital investment or variations in the wage structure across
5See Card (1999) for a recent survey.
6See Mincer (1975) and Baker (1997) among others and Vogel (2007) for an application to inter-
generational mobility.
6jobs erected by rms for the purpose of eort regulation and incentive compatibility.
For estimation purposes, the projection of current on permanent earnings is gener-
alized to include a time-varying parameter t;h to capture age-specic aspects in










Averaging parental earnings yi
0h across T years, the interaction of both types of mea-
surement error is considered. If parental and ospring's long-run status is proxied
by short-run earnings, equation 12 determines the potential bias.
plim ^ OLS




hV ar[y0] + 1
T V ar[0h]
(13)
Assuming h = 1, the probability limit of the estimated coecient ^ OLS
y is ty
instead of y. In the case of t = 1 (as implicitly assumed in the discussion of
transitory uctuations) this does no harm, but in general, the estimator will be
inconsistent and the inconsistency varies as a function of age t at which earnings
are observed. Focusing on the impact of h (setting t = 1), it is not obvious
whether the combination of transitory uctuations and lifecycle variation leads to
an amplication bias instead of an attenuation bias. For h > 1 the estimation is
downward biased, but for values smaller than one and minor transitory variance the
opposite is true. h is a summary measure of the attenuation bias resulting from
transitory uctuations as well as lifecycle variation. Therefore the age composition
of the sample matters (Jenkins 1987, Grawe 2006). In summary, measurement error
in ospring's status is not innocuous for consistency as well as measurement error
in parental long-run status. Both induce either amplication or attenuation bias of
the OLS estimation.
Using U.S. Social Security Administration earnings histories of members of the
Health and Retirement Study sample, Haider & Solon (2006) asses the magnitude of
measurement error in ospring's and parental permanent earnings separately. Their
dataset ranges from 1951 to 1991 and provides nearly career-long earnings histories
for a broadly representative sample of the U.S. population. This allows to derive a
7Figure 1: Estimated Correlation Between Current and Permanent Earnings
more precise estimate of the (logarithmized) present value of lifetime earnings ln V i.
Starting with the impact of measurement error in ospring's (permanent) earnings
level, the forward regression of lnV i on yi
t;h leads to the estimated slope coecient
^ t;h depicted in gure 1. Starting at a value around ^ t;h = 0:2 it increases steadily.
At age 32, the textbook assumption of t;h = 1 seems reasonable. Thenceforward,
^ t;h declines some in the late forties. Turning to the case of measurement error in
parental permanent earnings, the estimated reliability ratio ^ h is depicted in gure
2. It is the result of a backward regression of lnV i on a 5-year average of yi
t;h. A
signicant increase till age 30 is followed by a quite robust factor between 0.6 and
0.8, but after the age of 50, ^ h declines and the bias rises. Unfortunately, we are not
aware of any comparable work for the case of Germany.
2.2. Sample Homogeneity
In selected sub-populations with respect to location, socioeconomic status or oc-
cupation, the sample variance in long-run economic status is possibly less than
in the whole population. For example, a study by Sewell & Hauser (1975) was
based on a selective son-sample from Wisconsin, who graduated in 1957 and thus
excluded high-school dropouts, leaving only rather successful sons in the sample.
8Figure 2: Estimated Reliability Ratio
Similarly, Behrman & Taubman (1985) are conned to parental data on white male
twins born between 1927 and 1929, who both served in the Army. Presumably,
this father-sample is rather homogeneous. Both types of selectivity may introduce
a third source of inconsistency as Solon (1989) points out. To concentrate on the
eect of sample homogeneity, long-run status is assumed to be measured correctly
until indicated otherwise. Formally speaking, the parental/ospring-sample is more
homogeneous in long-run status, if the variance in permanent earnings V ar[y
j=0;1]
is only a fraction  of the population variance V ar[yj=0;1].
V ar[y
j=0;1] = V ar[yj=0;1] (14)
Under normality of parental economic status, selection on the dependent variable
leads to a proportional change in the estimated intergenerational elasticity, where
R2 is the coecient of determination of the population-based regression model
(Goldberger 1981).
plim ^ OLS
y = y < y (15)
 =

1   R2(1   )
(16)
9If  < 1 (implying  < 1) the estimated intergenerational elasticity ^ OLS
y is down-
ward inconsistent even though long-run status is measured correctly.
A sample exhibiting homogeneity in parental earnings does not aect the con-
sistency of intergenerational elasticity estimates. This is true as long as economic
status is measured correctly. If this is not the case, the downward bias is worsened
(Solon 1992, Wiegand 1997), see equation (17).

V ar[y0]
V ar[y0] + V ar[0h]











In applied empirical research, inclusion into an intergenerational dataset requires
for father and son to both report positive labor market earnings in the periods of
interest. Presumably, in such samples y is underestimated, but the use of larger
representative samples eases this problem. To the best of our knowledge, however,
there is no research on the magnitude of this bias available.
3. Econometric Approach and Sampling Procedure
We estimate the econometric model presented in equation (18). Son's observed
status yi
1t in year t is expressed as a regression function of father's observed status yi
0h
in year h, including age-controls for both (Solon 1992, Zimmerman 1992, Wiegand
1997, Vogel 2007). It is derived by the incorporation of age-earnings proles into
equations (2) and (3) and substitution into the basic equation (1).
yi







An individual's current earnings are determined by the level of permanent earnings
(yi
1;yi




h )], a general level of economic
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0 Ai
0h + 0 A2i
0h + i
0h (20)
10The empirical part builds on samples from the German Socio-Economic Panel7
(SOEP) from 1984 to 2006. To assure comparability of real earnings observed in
dierent years, they are adjusted by the real GDP-Growth Rate. Our measure of
long-run economic status are real8 monthly earnings before tax and social security
deductions as reported in each cross-section of the SOEP9. This allows for interna-
tional comparison10. Measuring all earnings variables in their natural logarithm, we
choose the intergenerational earnings elasticity as our indicator for intergenerational
persistence (or mobility) and use both terms interchangeably.
Thus, our indicator is a summary measure of personal characteristics shared by
parent and ospring that are valued in the German labor market. This includes
similarities in educational attainment, cognitive and noncognitive skills and personal
traits (Bowles, Gintis & Osborne-Groves 2001, Bowles & Gintis 2002, Heckman 2007,
Pfeier & Reu 2007).
Table 1: Final Sample Overview
Groups Excluded from Sample Measures of Economic Status Age - Restrictions
self-employed Son
part-time employed monthly earnings (1984 - 2006) between 30 - 50
East Germans Father
migrants monthly earnings (1984 - 2006)
younger brothers years of education
A novel feature of our study is the sampling procedure. We select pairs of fathers
and sons in a way that their earnings are observed as close in their lifecycle as pos-
sible. Furthermore, the bias due to transitory uctuations and lifecycle variation is
minimized, see table 1. As a start, the self-employed, who have more volatile earnings
(Baker & Solon 2003, Albarr an, Carrasco & Mart nez-Granado 2007, Pfeier 1994)
7Consult Haisken-DeNew & Frick (2005) for further information on the dataset.
8Deated by the consumer price index (base year 2000) supplied by the German Federal Statistical
Oce.
9This approach is similar to Wiegand (1997), but dierent from Vogel (2007), who calculates a
measure of yearly earnings from monthly earnings records.
10See Solon (1999) for a survey on intergenerational earnings mobility. We concentrate on persis-
tence of labor market earnings. For research using a more inclusive measure of total economic
status made up by a variety of diering types of income, earnings and monetary inheritance see
Piketty (2000) and Mulligan (1997) among others. It is left for future research to construct a more
inclusive measure with the SOEP, since sample size is reduced and the problem of measurement
error increases.
11are excluded. Only full-time employed are retained in the sample, that is individuals
reporting to work more than 35 hours the last week. Workers from East Germany
are excluded as well since the possibility for mobility increased dramatically after the
fall of the Berlin Wall and dynamic wage growth11 may have changed the reliability
of current earnings to reect permanent status. To avoid sample homogeneity, only
the oldest sibling is included in our baseline specication (Solon 1992). Migrants,
identied by their country of origin, are dropped for our basic analysis. Migration
might distort the long-run relationship between labor market earnings of father and
son due to the change of the labor market (Borjas 2006, Friedberg 2000). However,
we perform a separate analysis for migrants and discuss the results. For the group
of fathers, moving 5-year averages of earnings and age are calculated to reduce the
attenuation bias. Thus, if for a given observation earnings are not observable in each
of the four following years, it is dropped.
Furthermore, the following age restrictions are imposed (and relaxed again for
further discussion) to account for the time-varying association between short- and
long-run economic status. This procedure accounts for the pattern of the variance of
the transitory component over the lifecycle (which attens out at mid age in the U.S.
(Baker & Solon 2003)). Since the association between monthly and lifetime earnings
is still low for workers below the age of 30, we select workers above that age. For
younger workers job mobility is high and earnings are more volatile, partly because of
lower tenure (Haider & Solon 2006, Bj orklund 1993). Workers aged above 50 years
are excluded as well. Labor market status and hours worked may become more
volatile again which might depress the estimated level of persistence (Grawe 2006).
However, this line of reasoning may dier between countries, for instance as a result
of dierent industrial structures or dierent degrees of employment protection laws
(Blau & Kahn 1996, OECD 1999, Pries & Rogerson 2005).
Finally, father (obsk and obsl) and son (obsj and obsi) observations (of family n)
satisfying the sampling rule are matched in all possible combinations, see gure 3.
This procedure leads to numerous matched observations for each father-son pair.
To identify a unique pair, intended to lead to the most reliable estimate of the
intergenerational elasticity, a decision rule is implemented. For each observation we
select the one with the smallest absolute age dierence between father and son. This
is to ensure that father and son are observed at as similar stages in their lifecycle as


















Figure 3: Sampling Strategy
possible. If still more than one observation for a particular father-son pair fullls the
requirement, the one associated with the lowest father age is used. For comparison
and discussion, other samples with less restrictive selection rules are utilized in the
next section.
The sample contains 180 father-son pairs compared to Wiegand's (1997) 130 and
Vogel's (2007) 300. Table 2 depicts the basic statistics. The age dierence between
father and son amounts to 8.68 years. Sons in the sample report less earnings than
their matched fathers which is mainly explained by their early stage in the lifecycle.
While most information on father's economic status is obtained within the early
SOEP waves, the collection of osprings' information is not conned to the most
recent wave. The age-composition of our sample diers substantially from previous
works. Sons are 35 years old which is an increase of 4 years compared to Wiegand
(1997) and 13 years compared to Couch & Dunn (1997). Solon (1992) reports an
average age of 29 for sons, while Bj orklund & J antti (1997) rely on sons at the
age of 34 on average. An average age of 44 years for fathers is slightly lower than
the one reported by Wiegand (1997) with 46 years, while Couch & Dunn's (1997)
fathers are 51 years old. Solon's (1992) fathers are reported to be 42 years of age on
average, nearly identical to an average father in Bj orklund & J antti's (1997) sample
(43 years).
13Table 2: Final Sample Statistics
Statistic Fathers Sons
Gross Earnings in ¿
1 2,307.03 1,936.87
Sd. of Gross Earnings 716.82 640.40
Year of Observation 1,987 2,004
Age in Years 44.40 35.73
Age - Dierence in Years 8.68
Number of Observations 180
1 reported 5/1 - year average of adjusted real
gross monthly earnings
Selection could rise from the blind eye on individuals not meeting the selection
rules, table 2. The nal sample is compared to all workers living up to the sam-
ple requirements except for the need to report positive earnings 5 years in a row
and being matched with their ospring. The father-sample is contrasted in 1984,
while the son-sample is compared in 2004. Earnings in the father-sample are nearly
identical to the one reported by all workers in 1984 (2,331.01¿). However, the stan-
dard deviation is higher in the comparison group (782.43¿) in 1984. Using 5-year
averages of earnings in the father-sample, therefore, as intended, reduces transitory
uctuations. Comparing the son-sample, earnings are higher (1,917.13¿ in the com-
parison group) and show a higher standard deviation (574.15¿). In our son-sample
the average age is lower which induces higher wage dispersion.
144. Econometric Findings
4.1. Basic Results
Table 3: Basic Results
5 - Year Avg. Earnings Single - Year Earnings
OLS Estimate
Intergenerational Elasticity 0.282 0.205
95% Condence Interval (0.09 - 0.44) (0.08 - 0.32)





95% Condence Interval (0.09 - 0.65)
Standard Error 0.144
Observations 180
1 using years of education
The OLS estimate based on a 5-year average of earnings ^ OLS
y = 0:282 is higher
compared to Wiegand (1997), whereas the one-year snapshot is about the same, ta-
ble 3. Compared to Vogel (2007), the result based on the 5-year average of earnings
is similar. We use years of education12 as an instrument to bracket the intergen-
erational elasticity. According to the IV estimate the intergenerational elasticity
is higher, ^ IV
y = 0:374. Following Solon's (1992) approach, the intergenerational
elasticity of German Workers should lie between the two estimates and we suggest
a reasonable value of 1
3.
^ OLS
y = 0:282 < y < 0:374 = ^ IV
y
12This variable includes both, school and occupational education. The German school system intro-
duces dierentiated educational tracks after four grades of primary education. The basic school
(Hauptschule) graduates individuals after ve years of secondary education and is traditionally a
preparation for blue collar occupations. The middle school (Realschule) lasts six years and trains
for white collar employment. The highest track (Gymnasium) oers nine years of schooling and
a degree (Abitur), which is a precondition for academic studies. Completion of an apprenticeship
adds another 1.5 years, a technical college 3 years, and graduation form university increases years
of education by 5 years.
15The 95% condence interval of the IV estimate [0:09  ^ IV
y  0:66] includes the
OLS estimate. Although the two point estimates contain some useful information,
the degree of precision seems to be rather low. We come back to this issue in the
conclusion.
4.2. Investigating the Bias from Transitory Fluctuations
Table 4: Summary Results1: Balanced Panel
Father Measure







95% Condence Interval (0.09 - 0.44) (0.11 - 0.45) (0.11 - 0.44) (0.08 - 0.41) (0.04 - 0.35)
Standard Error 0.0870 0.0866 0.0854 0.0841 0.0798
Observations 180 180 180 180 180
Basic Specication
Source: own calculations
Level of Signicance: *** 1% **5% *10%
1 see Table 10 in the Appendix for the detailed results
2 average of father's logarithmized adjusted real gross monthly earnings
Table 4 and 5 report the general pattern that ^ OLS
y increases with the number
of years averaged as the attenuation bias declines. This is in line with equation
(6). For inclusion in the balanced panel, father earnings need to be observed for
5 years in a row even though only lower averages are used for the supplementary
estimations. The changing estimate is due to the reduced number of years averaged
and not to a change in the sample composition. For this reason, the number of
observations remains constant. The unbalanced panel, however, includes all pairs
with the necessary number of successive earnings observations for the father that
is needed for the respective estimation. A comparison of the OLS results in the
balanced and unbalanced panel reveals that the dierence between a 5- and 4-year
average of father's earnings is negligible. However, it makes a dierence in our
sample whether the estimate is based on a 1/2-year average compared to an 4/5-
year average. Averaging only a small number of years amplies the attenuation bias
due to a high volatility of the earnings measure utilized. This result is in line with
the literature as reported in section 2.
16Table 5: Summary Results1: Unbalanced Panel
Father Measure







95% Condence Interval (0.11 - 0.45) (0.13 - 0.45) (0.10 - 0.41) (0.07 - 0.34) (0.08 - 0.32)
Standard Error 0.0870 0.0815 0.0790 0.0695 0.0614
Observations 180 190 217 227 249
Basic Specication
Source: own calculations
Level of Signicance: *** 1% **5% *10%
1 see Table 11 in the Appendix for the detailed results
2 average of father's logarithmized adjusted real gross monthly earnings
The rather early decrease of the estimated coecient in the unbalanced panel might
be attributable to the construction of the panel. When lowering the number of years
averaged, the added individuals do not report earnings in the following year likely
due to un- or part-time employment. This implies that father-son pairs with larger
transitory uctuations are consecutively added to the panel.
4.3. Investigating the Bias from Lifecycle Variation
Raising the upper age-limit from 50 to 55 years results in a rather sharp increase in
sample size and a slight decrease in estimated intergenerational persistence. How-
ever, table 6 reveals an increase in the estimate when continuing to soften the age
restriction. This seems to be in line with Vogel (2007), whose estimate of intergener-
ational persistence in Germany based including individuals aged above 50 is slightly
higher. We oer two explanations. First, the increase could point at sample selection
with only pairs added that exhibit a particular strong persistence of earnings. But
a comparison of the descriptive statistics (years of education, monthly earnings) did
not oer any evidence on the type of selection. Second, the increase in the estimated
level of mobility could be explained by an increase in the reliability ratio h in our
sample rather than a decrease as documented for the United States, gure 2. This is
presumably the result of the comparatively high degree of centralization governing
wage determination in Germany and employment protection laws which, together
17with the accumulation of specic human capital, favor incumbent workers13. This
could decrease the transitory uctuations among older German workers.
Table 6: Summary Results1: Relaxing Age - Restrictions for Fathers







95% Condence Interval (0.11 - 0.45) (0.10 - 0.41) (0.22 - 0.49) (0.22 - 0.49)
Standard Error 0.0870 0.0794 0.0696 0.0686
Observations 180 240 281 285
Basic Specication
Source: own calculations
Level of Signicance: *** 1% **5% *10%
1 see Table 13 in the Appendix for the detailed results
2 5-year average of father's logarithmized adjusted real gross monthly earnings; son at least
30 years of age
Table 7 documents a signicant rise in the number of observations and a sharp
decline in the estimated intergenerational elasticity when the age requirement for
sons is consecutively lowered to 20 years. This seems to be in line with Haider &
Solon (2006). The parameter t (see equation (12) in section 2) is lowered as younger
and younger workers are added to the sample and the lifecycle bias rises.
Table 7: Summary Results1: Relaxing Age - Restrictions for Sons






95% Condence Interval (0.11 - 0.45) (0.12 - 0.39) (0.13 - 0.30)
Standard Error 0.0870 0.0666 0.0558
Observations 180 282 385
Basic Specication
Source: own calculations
Level of Signicance: *** 1% **5% *10%
1 see Table 14 in the Appendix for the detailed results
2 5-year average of father's logarithmized adjusted real gross monthly earn-
ings; father at most 50 years of age
13See Botero, Djankov, Porta & Lopez-De-Silanes (2004) and Franz & Pfeier (2006) among others.
18The analysis above gave the impression that the age-composition of either sample
is changed without aecting the other. Obviously, this is not true since father-
son pairs are added. However, negligible changes in the age composition of the
unchanged (with respect to the age restrictions imposed) sample support this ap-
proach.
4.4. An Analysis of Migrants and Further Sensitivity Checks
Analysis of Migrants
The analysis of the migrant population14 is based on 93 father-son pairs when re-
lying on a 5-year average of earnings, see table 15 in the Appendix for the detailed
results. It turns out, that the point estimate of the intergenerational earnings elas-
ticity (^ y = 0:41) is higher compared to our sample of German workers. While the
age structure of the samples are rather identical, there are substantial dierences
in average earnings. For migrants, son earnings are lower (1,617¿ compared to
1,936¿). The same is true for migrant fathers, who earn 1,789¿ on average com-
pared to 2,307¿ for a German father. This hints at possible non-linearities in the
intergenerational link. For example Corak & Heisz (1999) and Hertz (2005) present
evidence for stronger persistence among low-income families.
Including Younger Siblings
The inclusion of younger siblings raises the sample size from 180 to 224 when relying
on a 5-year average of father's earnings. The point estimate is slightly reduced to
^ OLS
y = 0:276. Siblings share the same family and community background which
makes similar long-run economic status more likely and increases homogeneity within
the sample. This depresses the estimated coecient slightly, see table 16 in the
Appendix for the detailed results.
14Identied by the fact, that at least the father is not born in Germany.
19Adjustment of Monthly Earnings
To ensure robustness with respect to the measure of comparability (GDP-Growth
in the baseline estimation), earnings are deated by the growth rate of average real
gross monthly earnings in Germany's industry sector (as reported by the German
Federal Statistical Oce). The estimated intergenerational elasticity is not aected,
see table 17 in the Appendix for the detailed results.
Instrumenting Parental Status
To compare our ndings with Wiegand (1997), the IV estimation is repeated instru-
menting parental status using the Wegener-Index, a standard index for occupational
prestige. The baseline estimate (^ IV
y = 0.372) remains unchanged. The nding that
both instruments lead to rather identical results is robust to changes in the sampling
rule, see table 18 in the Appendix for the detailed results.
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Figure 8 compares our result to the international evidence. Although the studies
dier with respect to data and methods, the comparison suggests higher mobility
(that is less persistence) in Germany compared to the United States and the United
Kingdom, but lower mobility compared to Sweden.




y = 0:4 for the United States and S
y = 0:2 for Sweden. In comparison to
former studies by Couch & Dunn (1997) and Wiegand (1997) on intergenerational
persistence in Germany, Vogel (2007) and our results suggest higher persistence.
This is the result of our special attention on the sources of potential lifecycle bias.
However, common to all studies presented in table 8 are the considerable condence
intervals, which currently forbid any strong comparative statements on the level of
intergenerational persistence.
20Table 8: International Perspective
Country OLS Result IV Result
United States
Mazumder (2005) 0.613 (0.09)a |
Solon (1992) 0.413 (0.09) 0.526 (0.14)
Zimmerman (1992) 0.400 (0.06) 0.330 (0.27)
United Kingdom
Dearden, Machin & Reed (1997) 0.240 (0.03) 0.443 (0.03)
Sweden
Bj orklund & J antti (1997) 0.216 (0.04) |
Germany
Couch & Dunn (1997) 0.124 (0.07) |
Wiegand (1997) 0.238 (0.06) 0.402 (0.13)
Vogel (2007) 0.266 (0.06) |
this volume 0.282 (0.09) 0.374 (0.14)
a Standard errors in parentheses.
For illustrative reasons, we conclude by guring out some consequences of the
value of GER
y = 1
3 for Germany. The intergenerational elasticity y translates
intragenerational inequality in parental long-run labor market status into the eco-
nomic advantage, which a child from parents with higher economic status can hope
for compared to one from lower status parents. Table 9 depicts the advantage of a
child with parents in the top permanent earnings decile compared to ospring born













21Table 9: Inequality and the Expected Perma-
nent Earnings Advantage
Intergenerational Elasticity
90/10 - Ratio 0.2 1
3 0.4 0.5
2.0 15% 25% 32% 41%
2.5 20% 35% 44% 58%
3.0 25% 44% 55% 73%
3.5 28% 51% 65% 87%
4.0 32% 59% 74% 100%
For Germany, Gernandt & Pfeier (2007) calculate a 90/10-percentile earnings ra-
tio of 2.5 for a cross-section sample of prime age dependent male workers in 2005,
which is rather close to our sample. Then, taking our advocated value for an inter-
generational elasticity in Germany of GER
y = 1
3, the expected earnings advantage
amounts to 35%. If GER
y would be 0.5, the advantage increases to 59%. We would
like to add that a value of 0 < y < 1 does not necessarily imply a compression of
the earnings distribution, because the variance of the error term i
1 in equation (1)
matters, too.
Summarizing our ndings, we nd intergenerational earnings persistence among
West German workers is higher than previously suggested. A value of GER
y = 1
3
still indicates that there is substantial intergenerational mobility, which presumably
is a result of the massive expansion of publicly funded education in Germany from
the seventies and the openness of the German labor market.
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